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Using a longitudinal   household  panel  dataset  in the  United 
Kingdom, where most interviews are conducted in September 
each year, we are able to show that the attacks of September 
11 resulted in lower levels of subjective well-being for those 
interviewed after that date in 2001 compared to those 
interviewed before it. This quasi-experiment provides one of 
the first examples of the impact of a terrorist attack in one 
country  on  well-being  in  another  country.  We  value  this 
effect through a cost of illness approach, which is estimated 
to be between £170million and £380 million. 
Keywords: terrorism; September 11; subjective well-being. 






















Terrorism  is  a  major  negative  externality  (Frey,  2004).  Some  costs  of 
terrorism are very direct and relatively easy to measure, such as the value of 
lives lost, reduction in consumption, etc., whilst others are more indirect and 
much more difficult to measure, such as increased fear and anxiety. One of the 
most well-known terrorist attacks are the attacks of September 11 2001 in the 
US. It has been shown that the attacks had detrimental effects to the economy 
in the US, particularly   in the New York region (Chernick   and Haughwout, 
2006) as well as intangible psychological costs (Galea et al, 2002; Schlenger 
et al, 2002). 
 
 
The  indirect  effects  of  terrorism,  which  might  be  large  in  their  own  right, 
could extend beyond national borders as they dominate media coverage 
(Eisensee  and  Stromberg,  2007).  It  is  very  difficult  to  identify  the  causal 
effects of terrorist attacks on individuals, regions or countries since there are 
sometimes no good comparable counterfactuals. As a result of this, one way 
of  valuing  the  indirect  negative  externalities  would  be  through  a  stated 
preference study, which would elicit a direct willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a 
reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack. 
 
 
Smith et al (2009) analysed US households’ ex ante WTP for three security 
policies that all address a terrorist attack on commercial aircraft with shoulder 
mounted   missiles.   The   main   policy being   anti-missile   laser   jamming 
countermeasures  mounted  on commercial  aircraft,  and this was compared to 
two other policies as well as the prospect of remaining with the status quo. 
Their WTP estimates for the anti-missile  laser jamming  intervention  ranged 
from  $100  to  $220  annually  per  household.  Using  a  random  utility  model 
Viscusi  (2009)  finds  that  reductions  in  deaths  from  terrorism  have  a  value 
almost twice as great as reductions in deaths from natural disasters, suggesting 
a  large  premium   for  dread  risk.  To  identify   the  international   negative 
spillovers of the 9/11 attacks in the UK, for example, we could ask the UK 
population how much they are willing to pay to eliminate the risk of terrorist 




This  hypothetical  WTP  approach  has  already  been  heavily  debated  (see 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Diamond and Hausman, 1993; Ariely et al, 2003), 
but it is only one way of valuing non-market goods. Another way is through 
people’s  experienced  utility  (Kahneman  et  al, 1997;  Dolan  and  Kahneman, 
2008), or what we describe as subjective well-being (SWB). This approach 
has already been used to value aircraft noise (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005), 
urban regeneration (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2008), and air pollution (Luechinger, 
2009). The use of SWB has shown to be a valid and reliable indicator of well- 
being (see Diener et al, 1999; Krueger and Schkade, 2008), especially since 
evolution  may  have  created  the  sensation  of  happiness  exactly  in  order  to 
affect our behaviour (Rayo and Becker 2007). 
 
 
This study presents the first causal evidence of an international spillover of 
terrorism using people’s SWB. We use the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to examine how the 9/11 attacks in the US had detrimental effects on 
the SWB of residents in the UK. The BHPS allows us to examine the 9/11 
attacks in a quasi-experimental  setting. The BHPS is administered  annually 
between the months of September and December, but the majority of surveys 
take place in September in a random manner. So comparing the SWB of the 
UK population before and after the 11
h of September in 2001, and comparing 
 




We  find  that  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks  decreased  the  SWB  of  those  UK 
residents who answered the survey after the 11
th  of September in 2001. This 
effect  is  large  and  robust  to  a  number  of  alternative  specifications  and 
samples. To value such an international negative externality, we use the cost 
of illness and income compensation approaches. The value of the 9/11 attacks 










3 Terrorism  and terror attacks have long been a major international  problem, 
with potentially serious consequences  for human welfare (Frey et al, 2007). 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were one of the most prominent acts of 
terrorism in recent times but just what are the consequences of such attacks? 
Economists  use  the  underlying  exogeneity  of  terrorist  attacks  as  a  way  to 
establish the causal relationship from those attacks to various economic 
outcomes, such as tourism (Enders et al, 1992), national output (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal,   2002;   Eckstein   and   Tsiddon,   2004),   net   foreign   direct 
investment (Abadie and Garzeazabal, 2008) and urban expansion (Blomberg 
and Sheppard, 2007). However, terrorism only directly affects a small fraction 
of the capital stock (Becker and Murphy, 2001), and there are also studies that 
show that it does not affect all economic outcomes (e.g. Glaeser and Shapiro 
(2002)  find  that  terrorism  has  not  altered  the  urban  form).  The  well-being 
consequences of terrorism have also been studied in terms of the birth weight 
of babies in areas with a higher concentration of land mines, where the causal 
mechanism  is  thought  to  be  the  effects  on  the  stress  of  mothers  during 
pregnancy (Camacho, 2008). 
 
 
The terrorist  attacks  of September  11, 2001,  have  stimulated  quite a bit of 
research in their own right. For example, there is now evidence to suggest that 
the attacks had a detrimental effect on the financial market (Chen and Siems, 
2004; Straetmans et al, 2008) and New York’s fiscal position (Dolfman and 
Wasser, 2004; Chernick and Haughwout, 2006). It has also been shown that 
the 9/11 attacks reduced the demand for air travel (Blunk et al, 2006; Blalock 
et al, 2007), with estimates ranging from $14 to $43billion a year (Santos and 
Haimes, 2004) to $214 to $420 billion (Gordon et al, 2007). There was also a 
significant   increase   in  the   number   of  fatal  traffic   accidents   after   9/11 
(Gigerenzer, 2004; Su et al, 2009), which has been found for other terrorist 
attacks (Stecklov and Goldstein, 2004). 
 
In terms of the intangible effects of 9/11, it has been found that survivors from 
damaged buildings reported substantial physical and psychological health 
problems  three  years  after  the  event  (Brackbill  et  al,  2006).  Post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) has been shown to be associated with direct exposure 
 
 
4 to the 9/11 attacks and the prevalence of PTSD in the New York City 
metropolitan  area  was  substantially  higher  than  elsewhere  in  the  country 
(Galea  et  al,  2002;  Schlenger  et  al,  2002).  Eidelson  et  al  (2003)  find  a 
significant increase in the amount of work – in terms of the number of clients 
–  received  by  psychologists  working  closest  to  Ground  Zero  compared  to 
those received by their colleagues working elsewhere in the country. 
 
 
The intangible  effects of 9/11 were felt elsewhere in the US. For example, 
PTSD  was  not  limited  to  those  who  experienced  the  9/11  attacks  directly 
(Silver et al, 2002), although the actual levels of stress outside of New York 
are  disputed  (Schlenger  et  al,  2002).  In  a  small  sample  from  Wisconsin, 
Krueger (2007) found that 9/11 increased sadness temporarily and decreased 
enthusiasm   for   at   least   seven   days   after   the   attacks.   In   a   nationally 
representative sample of Americans, Lerner et al (2003) found a heightening 
level  of  fear  and  anger  amongst  the  US  population  following  9/11.  More 
recently,  the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 have been shown to have 
negative effects on stress and have altered travel behaviour (Rubin et al, 2005) 
and criminal behaviour through extra policing (Draca et al, 2008). 
 
 
Despite these and a range of other studies, we are unaware of any attempt to 
determine  the  effects  of  the  attacks  on  the  SWB  of  those  outside  of  the 
attacked country, let alone quantify such effects. 
 
 




This study examines the effects of 9/11 on the SWB of those living in the 
United  Kingdom.  This  study  has two  main  strengths.  First,  we  use  a large 
longitudinal  dataset,  consisting  of  approximately  10,000  individuals,  which 
provides us with strong statistical power to discern patterns whist controlling 
for individual heterogeneity   and underlying  trends.  Second,  9/11 acts  as an 
exogenous shock to the randomised    sampled population, which provides us 







5 The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally representative of 
British  households,  and  is conducted  between  September  and  December  of 
each year (started in 1991). Respondents are interviewed in successive waves 
and the sample has remained representative of the British population since the 
early 1990s. For the study to be thought of a quasi-experiment, the timing of 
terrorist attacks need to be exogenous and largely randomly assigned in terms 
of  the  BHPS  interviews.  The  9/11  attacks  were  clearly  exogenous  to  the 
survey since many respondents  are interviewed in September each year but 
the date in September in which they are interviewed is random. 
 
 
The  measure  of  SWB  used  in  this  analysis  is  the  twelve  items  from  the 
negative affect scale of the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1978). 
Respondents  are asked how often (on a four point category scale) over the 
past few weeks they: (i) had lost sleep over worry; (ii) felt constantly under 
strain; (iii) felt they could not overcome difficulties; (iv) been feeling unhappy 
and depressed; (v) been losing confidence; (vi) been feeling like a worthless 
person; (vii) were playing a useful part in things; (viii) felt capable of making 
decisions; (ix) been able to enjoy day-to-day activities; (x) been able to 
concentrate;  (xi)  been  able  to  face  up  to  problems;  and  (xii)  been  feeling 
reasonably happy. The number of times a person places himself or herself in 
the top two categories was given a one, and then all twelve questions were 
added together to produce what is known as a Caseness    measure of SWB. 
This is a well-being score from zero to 12, coded so that the response with the 
lowest well-being value scores 12 and that with the highest well-being value 
scores zero. For simplicity, this count is reversed here, so that higher scores 
indicate higher levels of well-being. 
 
 
This composite rating is a good proxy for the transient component of moods 
(Watson and Clark, 1984) and has been used as a measure of SWB in recent 
studies by economists (Blanchflower  and Oswald,  2008; Clark, 2003; Clark 
and Etile, 2002; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Jones and Wildman, 2008) and to 








The well-being equation in a difference-in-differences  (D-i-D)  setting  takes 
 








where Wit  denotes SWB of individual i at time t, Post   11it is a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the individual was interviewed post-9/11 attacks 
(between 12
th September 2001 and 30
th September 2001), T is a year dummy, 
 
i.e. year 2001, and !  it  is the error term. The parameter "3  represents the true 
 
causal  effect  of  the  September  11  attacks  on  SWB  of  those  interviewed 
between 12
th September 2001 and 30
th  September 2001. Assuming that in the 
absence of the September 11 attacks Wit  would have changed identically in the 
 
pre-9/11 and post-9/11 groups between 2000 and 2001. More formally, in the 
 
absence of treatment, 
 
"3 would be zero, i.e. there would be no difference in 
the mean well-being scores between pre- and post-9/11 (see Meyer, 1995). In 
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Note that this approach can accommodate multiple time periods and multiple 
treatment groups. We can then estimate "3 by applying OLS to equation (1). 
 
 
The panel nature of the BHPS allows us to follow the same individuals who 
were interviewed in 200 and September 2001 (excluding September 11 itself). 
A key assumption  here is that, for those interviewed  in September  of each 
BHPS year, the date of the interview is orthogonal to the date of treatment, i.e. 
September  11.  This  yields  for  the  years  2000-2001  a  balanced  panel  that 
consists of 9,535 observations (4,908 individuals). Of those, 1,020 individuals 
were interviewed between 1
st and 10
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2  #. 0 001; N #,9 535 





This implies that whilst there is a significant  increase in the average SWB 
scores for the control group from 2000 to 2001, the same cannot be said for 
the treated group, i.e. those interviewed after the September 11 attacks. The 
D-i-D estimate is negative, statistically significant, and sizeable; the average 
treatment effect is -0.316 with a well-determined standard error of 0.105. 
 
 
To check whether the above results are not driven by seasonality – i.e. the 
control group may have done their interviews in the doom and gloom winter 
of  2000,  whilst  the  treated  group  may  have  done  their  interviews  in  the 
relatively more cheerful Autumn time of the same year – we can rerun OLS 
on those interviewed in September of both years only. By restricting to the 

















2  #. 0 073; N #,1965 
Standard errors are in parentheses; * & 5%; * * & 1%. 
 
 
The  average  treatment  effect  continues  to  be  negative  and  statistically 
significant at the 1% level; those interviewed post-9/11 report a 0.430 lower 
SWB score than they should have experienced in absence of the September 11 
attacks.   The   slight   difference   in   size   between   the   first   (no   seasonal 





8 average treatment effect implies that we may need to control for the seasonal 
effects,  i.e.  the  month  of  the  interview  before  or  after  the  September  11 




One of the key assumptions underlying validity of the above D-i-D estimate is 
that differences    between treatment   and control group would have remained 
constant in absence of treatment (Meyer, 1995). We can check whether this is 
the case for the September 11 attacks by plotting the well-being trends for the 
control and the treated groups prior to 2001. Here, a 5-year period before and 
1-year  after  the  event  is  arbitrarily  chosen  to  generate  the  plot,  although 
similar patterns (but with significantly smaller N) can be obtained with longer 
leads and lags. 
 
 
We can see from Figure 1 that the average levels of SWB for both pre and 
post-9/11 groups follow a very similar trend in the years that precede 2001. 
The trend however diverges in the year of the September 11 attacks. That is, 
there is a noticeable increase in the average level of SWB of those interviewed 
pre-9/11 from 2000 to 2001, which could be due to a number of a reasons 
such  as  a  very  good  summer,  general  mood  in  the  country  after  the  2001 
general election (see Dolan et al (2008) for the effects of national elections on 
SWB). However, consistent with the estimated average treatment effects 
obtained in the previous OLS regressions, the average SWB levels for those 
interviewed post-9/11 hardly changes at all from 2000. In other words, there 
appears to be an ‘offsetting’ effect on the rising trend of SWB for the treated 
group,  thus  providing  some  validations  for  the  average  treatment  effect 
obtained in our D-i-D model. Since both groups have already been exposed to 
the event by the time the survey was conducted in 2002, it is not surprising to 
see that the trend of SWB converges again one year after the 9/11 attacks. 
What is very interesting is that the actual SWB levels do not return to the 
same levels as the previous year for the treated group. 
 
Table 1 provides further robustness checks on the D-i-D estimates. Column 1 
of Table 1 controls for a number of covariates  that  are consistent  with  the 
 
 
9 determinants of well-being (Clark et al, 2007; Dolan et al, 2008b), including 
household  income,  age, age  squared, gender, education, employment    status, 
health status, number of children, and regional dummies. We also control for 
the pre- and post-9/11 seasonal effects by including dummies for the month 
interviewed  in 2000.  In the full  specification,  OLS  continues  to produce  a 
negative and statistically significant average treatment effect; the coefficient 
on the interaction between the post-9/11 group and the year (=2001) dummy 
is -0.342 with a statistically well-determined standard error of 0.107. 
 
 
The results might be driven by those individuals who were interviewed 
immediately after 9/11 in 2001. To check for this, the second column of Table 
1 splits the post-9/11 group into two groups: interviews that took place 
September 12-20 and 21-30. Whilst those interviewed between 21
st  and 30
th 
September 2001 reported a slightly lower average well-being score than those 
interviewed immediately after the September 11 attacks, i.e. between 12
th and 
20
th  September 2001, both still reported a significant drop in SWB between 
 
2000 and 2001 compared to the control group. It is interesting here that those 
who  were  interviewed  later  on  in  the  month  (i.e.  21
st   –  30
th)  were  more 






To  provide  further  robustness  checks,  we  could  argue  that  the  selection 
process into the treated group is not random, i.e. the selection process may be 
correlated with unobserved factors that are also correlated with measures of 
SWB. To check for this, we estimate in the first column of Table 2 a D-i-D 
model with multiple time periods using fixed effects estimator. Using a seven- 
year   balanced   panel   (1996-2002),   fixed   effects   estimator   produces   an 
interaction coefficient between post-9/11 and T=2001 of -0.345 with a 
statistically significant standard error of 0.138. This average treatment effect 
is  remarkably  similar  to  the  one  obtained  in  the  OLS  regressions,  which 
suggests that even if there was selection by unobserved time-invariant factors 
into  the  treated  group,  the  effect  is  negligible.  The  absence  of  unobserved 
heterogeneity bias also means that we can estimate equation (1) using either 




Given that we have more than two time periods in our analysis, there is the 
potential for serial correlation which could understate the standard deviation 
of  the  estimated  treatment  effects,  leading  to  an  overestimation  of  the  t- 
statistic (Bertrand et al, 2004). However, the introduction of AR(1) errors into 
the random effects regression in the second column of Table 2 does not lead to 
a substantial increase in the standard errors, and a virtually identical average 








The effect of the 9/11 attacks on SWB seems large and robust, and valuing the 
impact  in  monetary  terms  would  facilitate  cost-benefit  analysis.  We  can 








A GHQ score of around 2 is a conservative  threshold level at which lower 
levels of SWB can be diagnosed as clinical depression (Goldberg et al, 1998), 
and  so  we  can  see  how  many  people  in  the  United  Kingdom  may  have 
suffered the equivalent of clinical depression as a result of the 9/11 attacks. 
From the BHPS sample in 2001, there were 253 people between a GHQ value 
of 2 and 1.01. A 0.316 or 0.430 change in the GHQ (the range of values from 
our estimates) at this part of the distribution represents 80 to 109 people. That 
is,  0.47%  to  0.64%  of  the  BHPS  sample  could  have  been  diagnosed  with 
clinical depression as a result of 9/11. Aggregating this up to the 45.5 million 
adults in the UK in 2001, around 214,000 to 291,000 UK residents may have 
experienced clinical depression as a result of 9/11. 
 
To treat such clinical depression, GPs usually provide a course of cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT). The cost of one course of CBT is around £800 
(NICE, 2008). Therefore, aggregating this up, we could argue that the 9/11 
 
 
11 attacks had the equivalent effect of costing £171million to £233million. This 
range of values can be seen as a lower bound estimate for three reasons. First, 
the depression threshold used here is a relatively conservative one. If we used 
the threshold as being 3 on the GHQ, the costs would become in the range of 
£211million to £273million. Second, CBT is not fully effective. The current 
effect rates are around 60% (Layard et al, 2007). So if we gave another course 
of CBT treatment to the 40% of people who did not recover first-time around, 
and using the conservative threshold value of 2 on the GHQ, our estimates 
would  rise  to  £214million  -  £290million.  Third,  these  estimates  are  local 








Income compensations (ICs) have been used to value a range of non-market 
goods  (see  Dolan  and  Metcalfe,  2008).  The  calculation  of  the  IC  for  the 
terrorist attacks is the implicit utility-constant trade-off between the terrorist 
attacks and income. The IC is defined as the increase in income necessary to 
hold utility constant if the individual has been exposed to the terrorist attacks. 
In an indirect utility function, this would be given by: 
 
 




where v(.) is the indirect utility function, y0 is the initial income, T0 is the pre- 
 
9/11 attacks condition, and T1  is the post-9/11 attacks condition. Given this, 
and the micro-econometric specification in (1), the IC (at mean income levels) 
can be defined as: 
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12 In our sample, we did not find a significant income effect due to our sample 
restrictions. As a result, we use the IC as a guide to what the costs could look 
like using this approach but it would not be definitive. There have been other 
studies, however, that have shown that an income effect in GHQ regressions 
can be found, especially using instrumental variables (IV). We could, for 
example,   use  Oswald  and  Powdthavee’s   (2008)  estimate   of  the  natural 
logarithm  of  personal  income  on  GHQ being 0.818 (fixed effects – IV) to 




We can use these estimates in equation (4) to estimate the value of terrorism 
from  SWB.  The  estimates  of  0.316  (OLS  no  controls)  to  0.430  (OLS 
seasonality controlled) represent our best causal effects of the terrorist attacks. 
Using these estimates, and an average UK personal income of £24,000, we 
find that the average treatment    effect for each individual    is worth between 
£7,500  and  £17,000.  This  is  a  very  large  amount  of  income  needed  to 
compensate each individual for experiencing  the 9/11 attacks.  The cause of 
this large IC, apart from the large effect the 9/11 attacks have on SWB, is the 
income coefficient. This income coefficient is low because of the use of panel 
data, where the effects of income seem to be small. While the income-SWB 
debate will shed further light on our estimates, we do not currently have good 
estimates of the causal effect of income on SWB throughout the income 
distribution to know what coefficient to use and how to weight it. Therefore, 
these costs are a representation of what could be, and we arrive at the same 
conclusion  as  Deaton  et  al  (2009)  that  without  a  more  robust  income 






This study has shown that the 9/11 attacks in the United States lowered the 
psychological  well-being  of  United  Kingdom  residents  –  by  a  GHQ  well- 
being score of approximately  0.3-0.4. Comparing this magnitude with other 
life events within our data is difficult since many events, such as marriage or 
being  unemployed,  are endogenous.  Notwithstanding  this,  the magnitude  of 
the 9/11 effect is potentially worse than becoming divorced, and about one- 
 
 
13 third of the effect of being unemployed or widowed in the same sample using 
the same methods. These are significant and robust effects. 
 
 
The effects provide us with cost estimates of the effect of the 9/11 attacks on 
UK  SWB  of  around  the  £170million-£380million  range.  Using  an  income 
compensation  seriously inflates these numbers but we do not have a robust 
income coefficient to use, which renders such values as imprecise. These cost 
estimates go some way towards demonstrating that the fear and psychological 
cost   induced   by  terrorism   is  substantial   and  might   greatly   exceed   the 
discounted physical harm (Sunstein, 2003; Becker and Rubinstein, 2004). This 
is due to the fact that ‘dread’ makes up a significant part of the risks from 
terrorism (Viscusi, 2009), and this especially true given that recent media 





Whatever the precise scale the impact of 9/11 across the UK population, it is 
possible  that  individuals  in  the  UK  were  affected  by  9/11  because  they 
believed that such events were more likely to happen in the UK in the near 
future,  thereby  increasing  their  fear  and  uncertainty.  Given  Krueger  and 
Laitin’s  (2008)  finding  that  terrorists  are  more  likely  to  attack  wealthy 
countries,  it  seems  natural  for  individuals  in other  wealthy  countries  to be 
affected  by  terrorist  attacks  overseas.  Indeed,  the  results  from  our  study 
support the Caplin and Leahy (2001) model where the events that caused the 
initial fear and uncertainty took place in another country. 
 
 
We can only speculate about such issues here as there has certainly been little 
discussion of the international spillover effects of security or terrorism. The 
US Congress Joint Economic Committee (2002) has suggested that some of 
the  largest  costs  of  terrorism  were  the  difficult  to  measure  costs  of  added 
anxiety,  stress,  and  psychological  disorders  associated  with  the  increased 
threat of terrorism. This paper has shown that these costs may also have been 
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Note:  This  is a balanced  panel,  with  691 individuals  completed  the survey  between  1
st  of 
September  2001 and 10
th  of September  2001, and 2,320 individuals  completed  the survey 
between  September  12
th   2001  and  September  30
th   2001.  The  same  individuals  are  then 
tracked over the 7-year period from 1996 to 2003. The vertical line represents the year of the 
































Table 1: Well-being and the September 11 attacks: OLS regressions
 
Subjective well-being  (1)  (2) 
Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) 
 







Post-9/11 (21st Sept-30th Sept 2001) 










  [0.095]**  [0.095]** 
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) 
 







T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (21st Sept-30th Sept 2001) 
  [0.115]* 
-0.425 
  [0.123]** 
Regional dummies (20) 
Month interviewed dummies (9) 










Overall R-squared  0.0635  0.0644 
 
Note:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  **<1%;  *<5%  significance  levels.  Background 
variables  include  age
2/100,  log of household  income,  employment  status  (9), education  (6), 
and  marital  status  (5).  All  unique  individuals   interviewed   after  September   in  2001  are 








































Dependent variable: Subjective well-being  Fixed effects  AR(1) errors RE 
Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  0.213 
  [0.126] 
T = 1996  -0.134  0.136 
  [0.159]  [0.124] 
T = 1997  -0.104  0.099 
  [0.144]  [0.124] 
T = 1998  0.032  0.167 
  [0.132]  [0.123] 
T = 1999  0.158  0.229 
  [0.125]  [0.116]* 
T = 2001  0.383  0.315 
  [0.125]**  [0.116]** 
T = 2002  0.365  0.226 
  [0.134]**  [0.124] 
T = 1996 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  0.003  -0.038 
  [0.138]  [0.140] 
T = 1997 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  -0.015  -0.044 
  [0.137]  [0.140] 
T = 1998 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  -0.041  -0.056 
  [0.137]  [0.139] 
T = 1999 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  0.032  0.022 
  [0.137]  [0.131] 
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  -0.345  -0.331 
 





  [0.138]  [0.140] 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9)  Yes  Yes 
Background variables (20)  Yes  Yes 
Observations  22,168 
Number of individuals  3,209 
Overall R-squared  0.02 
 
Note:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  **<1%;  *<5%  significance  levels.  Background 
variables  include  age
2/100,  log of household  income,  employment  status  (9), education  (6), 
and  marital  status  (5).  All  unique  individuals   interviewed   after  September   in  2001  are 



















Table 3: The valuation of the 9/11 attacks on UK SWB
 
Lower bound estimate    Upper bound estimate 
 
Cost of illness 
 

















£171 million   £233 million 
 
 
£239 million    £326 million 
 
 
£211 million    £273 million 
 
 
£295 million    £382 million 
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